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H. L. A. Hart’s The Concept of Law is an important and infl uential work 
in the modern philosophy and theory of law. In it, Hart introduced and 
discussed three imaginary scenarios: the absolute monarchy under the 
Rex dynasty; the pre-legal society governed by primary rules of obligation; 
and the worlds in which rules would be different from those in our actual 
world. Although Hart did not use the expression “thought experiments” 
in his work, some of his interpreters refer to the imaginary scenarios as 
thought experiments. However, interpreters do not go into the question of 
whether the imaginary scenarios in Hart’s work do indeed satisfy a gen-
eral characterization of thought experiments. In this article, the author 
fi rst summarizes the three imaginary scenarios in Hart’s work and points 
to the context within which we encounter each of them. Then, he makes use 
of a general characterization of thought experiments in the contemporary 
philosophical literature and briefl y examines the way and the extent to 
which the imaginary scenarios in Hart’s work can satisfy its requirements.
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1. Introduction
Are there any thought experiments in law? If we look for an answer 
to this question in the recently published prestigious The Routledge 
Companion to Thought Experiments (hereinafter RCTE), we will not 
fi nd one. Its Part II contains discussions on thought experiments in 
particular disciplines, such as political philosophy, economics, theol-
ogy, ethics, physics, biology and mathematics, but not in law.1 Neither 
1 The editors of RCTE advocate a further expansion of the discussion to thought 
experiments in other disciplines, including law (see Stuart, Fehige and Brown (2018: 
3, 5)).
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does the ambitious work on the history of philosophy and theory of 
law, their orientations and main topics, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy 
and General Jurisprudence (hereinafter TLPGJ) in 12 volumes, con-
tain a discussion on thought experiments in law. It uses the expression 
“thought experiment” twice: fi rst, to refer to Otfried Höffe’s state of 
nature thought experiment (Hofmann 2016: 335) and, second, to refer 
to F. K. von Savigny’s idea of the process of statutory interpretation 
(Chiassoni 2016b: 584). However, when discussing the contribution 
to the legal theory of the two great contemporary philosophers, John 
Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, TLPGJ fails to inform us that the origi-
nal position of the fi rst and the idealized speech situation of the second 
are also thought experiments (Riley 2009). Considering that these two 
publications, each highly respectable in its fi eld of research, are silent 
or scarcely informative about thought experiments in law, any further 
information about the topic is welcome.
I will be focusing here on H. L. A. Hart’s The Concept of Law, (here-
inafter CL), (1961 [1994]). It is an important and infl uential work in 
the modern philosophy and theory of law.2 In CL, Hart introduced 
an d discussed, among other things, several imaginary scenarios: the 
absolute monarchy under the Rex dynasty (52–66); the pre-legal soci-
ety governed by primary rules of obligation (91–99); and the worlds in 
which rules would be different f rom those in our actual worl d (193–200). 
These imaginary scenarios are designed by Hart to dismiss the theo-
ries of law of some other authors, such as John Austin (1832 [1954]),3 
and to present some of the main ideas of his own theory. First, in his 
discussion of the imaginary absolute monarchy under the Rex dynasty, 
Hart demonstrates the inad equacy of the central notions of Austin’s 
theory of law, those of sovereignty and general habit of obedience, and 
the indispensability of the idea of rules for the understanding of law. 
Then, in his discussion of the imaginary pre-legal society governed by 
primary rules of obligation and the imaginary worlds in which rules 
would be different from those in our actual world, Hart presents two 
other main ideas of his theory of law, in addition to the idea of rules, 
that is, the idea of law as the union of primary rules of obligations and 
secondary rules of power, and the idea of mi nimum content of natural 
law. Thus, all the three main ideas of Hart’s theory of law turn around 
imaginary scenarios.
Although Hart did not use the expression “thought experiments” 
in CL, some of Hart’s interpreters refer to his imaginary scenarios 
as thought experiments and/or suggest that the method of thought 
experimentation is coequal to linguistic methods in his work. For ex-
2 On Hart’s life and work, see the following books and collections of essays in 
English: d’Almeida, Edwards and Dolcetti (2013); Postema (2011); Simpson (2011); 
Kramer, Grant, Colburn and Hatzistavrou (2008); MacCormick (2008); Lacey (2004); 
Colema n (2001); Bayles (1992); Leith and Ingram (1988); Gavison (1987); Moles 
(1987); Hacker and Raz (1977). For other works on Hart’s CL, see references.
3 He should not be confused with Hart’s philosopher colleague J. L. Austin.
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ample, Nicos Stavropoulos argues that Hart in CL, in addition to an 
examination of the semantics of imperatives,4
… further employs less obviously linguistic methods, namely, the pursuit 
of philosophical argument as to the true content of the key concepts, by 
means of the familiar techniques of drawing distinctions and defending 
them through thought experiments. (2001: 67)
Another author, Pierluigi Chiassoni, claims that “Hart regards the meth-
od of philosophical imagination as a major tool in the game of descriptive 
metaphysics”, the method that “[i]n Hart’s understanding … requires 
the working out of thought experiments meant to explain how our ac-
tual conceptual and institutional structures are, and why, by comparing 
them with alternative imaginary situations” (2011: 65; 2013: 456).5
Unlike Stavropoulos, who does not give any concrete example of 
thought experiments in Hart’s CL, Chiassoni lists three thought ex-
periments in Hart’s work: the simple model of law as coercive orders; 
the idealized picture of a primitive, pre-legal, society ruled only by a 
set of unconnected primary rules of obligation; and the theory of the 
minimum content of natural law. (They are the same as the imaginary 
scenarios that I have mentioned above under slightly different appel-
lations.) However, Chiassoni does not discuss the thought experiments 
in detail. Still, other authors (Priel 2013: 544; Giudice 20 15: 59; von 
Daniels 2016: 109–112; and Houlgate 2017: 51) refer to som e of the 
imaginary scenarios in Hart’s CL as thought experiments.
These aut hors usefull y draw attention to the imagina ry scenarios in 
Hart’s CL as thought experiments and the thought experimentation as 
an integral part of the methodology that underlies his work.6 However, 
they do not go into the qu estion of whether Hart’s imaginary sce narios in 
CL do indeed satisfy a general characterization of thought e xper im ents. 
Until we have an answer to this question in the fi rst place, we cannot say 
whether their interpretation of Hart’s work is on the right track.
4 According to Stavropoulos (2001: 67), Hart’s examination of semantics of 
imperatives consists of an analysis of “… the meaning of expressions such as ‘to 
order’ … and ‘to give an order’ … ‘to address’, as applied to commands … and to laws 
… ‘obedience’ … ‘being obliged’, ‘having an obligation’, and ‘duty’ … and ‘valid’. It 
also results in the truth conditions of propositions such as ‘a legal system exists’ … 
‘it is the law that X’ and ‘in England they recognize as law X’ … ‘rule X is valid’ … or 
those expressing the existence of obligations … and a number of other expressions 
and propositions” (page references to Hart’s CL are omitted).
5 Chiassoni (2016: 64) also uses expressions “mental experiments” and 
“experiments in ‘philosophical imagination’”.
6 In her biography of Hart, Nicola Lacey tells us that Hart was famous for 
inventing games of wit or ingenuity that he and his wife Jenifer used to play with 
their friends Isaiah and Aline Berlin: “The game consisted in a thought experiment 
in which  the Harts’ and the Berlins’ guests wake up to fi nd themselves with the 
other family, and involved wry comparisons of the comportment of their respective 
guests” (Lacey 2004: 340). However, Lacey says nothing about Hart’s attitude 
towards thought experimenting in his professional work as opposed to his leisure-
time activity.
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In the section 2, I will fi rst summarize the three imaginary sce-
narios in Hart’s CL and point to the context of his work within which 
we encounter each of them, Then, in the section 3, I will m ake use 
of a g eneral characterization of thought experiments in the contem-
porary philosophical literature, including the aforementioned RCTE, 
and briefl y examine the way and the extent to wh ich the imaginary 
scenarios in Hart’s work can satisfy its requirements.
Before I do this, l et me note that in o ther works of his, Hart intro-
duced and discussed several other imaginary scenarios: the criminal 
law without excusing conditions (1958 [2008]: 47–8); the counterfac-
tual ca usation (1959 [1985]) and the pure theory of imperatives (1970 
[1983]: 312–13). Hart has also discussed some imaginary scenarios and 
thought experiments invented by other authors: F. W. Maitland’s state 
of Nusquamia (1954 [1983]: 37–39); L. L. Fuller’s Rex the lawmaker 
(1965 [1983]: 347–53); Rawls’s original position (1973 [1983]); Robert 
Nozick’s emergence of minimal state (1976 [1983]: 150–51) and Ron-
ald Dworkin’s Hercules the judge (1977 [1983]: 139, 154; 1961 [1994]: 
264). Hart termed “Gedankenexperiment” (“thought experiment”), 
(1958 [2008]: 47) an imaginary situation in which criminal law is op-
erating without excusing conditions, this being the only occasion in his 
works, as far as I know, that he used the expression. Of course, from 
the fact that Hart terms the criminal law without excusing conditions 
as a “thought experiment”, it still does not follow that it really is a 
thought experiment. If we want to argue that the latter is a thought 
experiment, we will require a characterization of a genuine thought 
experiment. We will also require such a characterization, if we want to 
argue that other imaginary scenarios in Hart’s works are thought ex-
periments, even though Hart does not call them thought experiments. 
I have already said I will examine here only the imaginary scenarios 
in Hart’s CL as possible candidates for thought experiments. Last but 
not least, it has to be noted that Hart is cre dited with having revived the con-
temporary debate on the doctrine of double effect (1967 [2008]) from which 
some famous thought experiments emerged, such as the terror bomber 
and strategic bomber thought experiment and the tram/trolley thought 
experiment (Di Nucci 2004).
2. Three imaginary scenarios
In this section, I summarize the imaginary scenarios in Hart’s CL that 
this article deals with and point to the context of his work within which 
we encounter each of them. They are:
– the  absolute monarchy under the Rex dynasty;
– the pre-legal society governed by primary rules of obligation; and
– the worlds in which rules would be different from those in our actual 
world.
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The absolute m onarchy under the Rex dynasty
In Chapters II–IV of CL, Hart states and criticizes Austin’s theory of 
law.7 On Austin’s theory, Hart writes in the fi rst of these two chapters: 
… there must, wherever there is a legal system, be some persons or body 
of persons issuing general orders backed by threats which are generally 
obeyed, and it must be generally believed that these threats are likely to 
be implemented in the event of disobedience. This person or body must be 
internally supreme and externally independent. If, following Austin, we call 
such a supreme and independent person or body of persons the sovereign, 
the laws of any country will be the general orders backed by threats which 
are issued either by the sovereign or subordinates in obedience to the sov-
ereign. (25)
In Chapter III, Hart criticizes Austin’s notion of general orders 
backed by the threat of sanction by arguing that it is inadequate to ac-
count for the content, the mode of origin and the range of application 
of many laws that modern legal systems contain. He then goes on in 
Chapter IV to criticize Austin’s theory on the ground that its notions of 
sovereignty and general habit of obedience are inadequate to account 
for the continuity and the persistence of law, as well as legal limita-
tions on legislative authority.
In this context, Hart introduces and discusses the imaginary abso-
lute monarchy under the Rex dynasty. He asks the reader to imagine 
a society in which Rex is an absolute monarch or sovereign (52). Rex is 
habitually obeyed by the bulk of his subjects, but he habitually obeys 
no one else. He exercises power over his subjects by issuing general 
orders backed by the threat of sanction, requiring them to do various 
things and to abstain from doing certain other things. Although some 
incidents of disobedience took place during the early years of the reign 
of Rex, the problems have resolved themselves and the subjects set-
tled into a habit of obeying his orders. Hart asks the reader to suppose 
further, namely, that after a long successful reign, Rex dies leaving 
a son, Rex II, who immediately starts to issue orders (53). The ques-
tions of continuity and persistence of law arise: “Would the orders of 
Rex II be already law?” and “Would the orders of the dead Rex still be 
law? ” (62). Answering the se questions in the manner Au stin’s theory 
requires, leads to an absurd conclusion. First, Rex II has not reigned 
long enough for the subjects to have had time to develop a habit of 
obeying his orders. More importantly, the mere fact that the subjects 
habitually obeyed the orders of his father does not confer on Rex II any 
right to succeed him and issue orders in his place (59–60). Therefore, 
7 Hart claims (1961 [1994]: 18) that he is considering and criticizing a modifi ed 
version of Austin’s theory in its strongest form, and not the theory as Austin 
formulated it in The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (1832 [1954]). In a 
lengthy note (1961 [1994]: 282–283). Hart enumerates the additions, modifi cations 
and qualifi  cations he made to Austin’s theory.
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Rex I I would not be a sovereign and his orders would not already be 
law. On the other hand, being dead, Rex is no longer habitually obeyed. 
Therefore, neither would he be a sovereign nor would his orders still be 
law. The absurd consequence is that, on Austin’s theory, the imaginary 
absolute monarchy over which Rex has reigned would end up without a 
sovereign and without law, at least until the subjects settle into a habit 
of obeying Rex II and his orders.
However, even in an absolute monarchy, Hart claims, th ere must be
some accepted fundamental rules specifying a class or line of persons whose 
word is to constitute a standard of behaviour for the society, i.e. who have 
the right to legislate. Such a rule, thoug h it must exist now, may in a sense 
be timeless in its reference: it may not only look forward and refer to the 
legislative operation of a future legislator but it may also look back and 
refer to the operations of a past one. (62–3)
The same is true of the imaginary absolute monarchy under the Rex 
dynasty:
Each of a line of legislators, Rex I, II, and III, may be qualifi ed under the 
same general rule that confers the right to legislate on the eldest living 
descendant in the direct line. When the individual ruler dies his legisla-
tive work lives on; for it rests upon the foundation of a general rule which 
successive generations of the society continue to respect regarding each leg-
islator whenever he lived. In the simple case Rex I, II, and III, are each 
entitled, under the same general rule, to introduce standards of behaviour 
by legislation. (63)
The answer to the questions of continuity and persistence of law, 
“Would the orders of Rex II be already law?” and “Would the orders of 
the dead Rex still be law?”, leads now to no absurd consequence. The 
absurdity is removed by assuming that there is a general rule recogniz-
ing the enactments of each legislator in the direct lineal succession, 
Rex I and Rex II, as law.8
In the rest of Chapter IV, Hart questions the necessity of a sover-
eign with legally illimitable power for the existence of law as well as 
the very possibility in modern legal systems of a sovereign in Austin’s 
sense. As a substitute for Austin’s notions of sovereignty, general or-
ders backed by the threat of sanction and general habit of obedience, 
Hart introduces the idea of rules, without which “we cannot hope to 
elucidate even the most elementary forms of law” (80).
The pre-legal society governed by primary rules of obligation
After demonstrating the inadequacy of Austin’s theory for the under-
standing of law, Hart announces in Chapter V of CL “a fresh start” (79, 
80). The starting point of such a fresh start is the distinction between 
two types of rules:
8 On his discussion of the continuity and the persistence of law in the context of 
extended imaginary scenario where Rex dynasty has been overthrown in revolution 
and Brutus becomes new sovereign, see Hart (1965 [1983]: 362–63).
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Under rules of the one type, which may well be considered the basic or pri-
mary type, human beings are required to do or abstain from certain actions, 
whether they wish to or not. Rules of the other type are in a sense parasitic 
upon or secondary to the fi rst; for they provide that human beings may 
by doing or saying certain things introduce new rules of the primary type, 
extinguish or modify old ones, or in various ways determine their incidence 
or control their operations. Rules of the fi rst type impose duties; rules of 
the second type confer powers, public or private. Rules of the fi rst type con-
cern actions involving physical movement or changes; rules of the second 
type provide for operations which lead not merely to physical movement or 
change, but to the creation or variation of duties or obligations. (81)
Hart claims that
in the combination of these two types of rule there lies what Austin wrongly 
claimed to have found in the notion of coercive orders, namely, ‘the key to 
the science of jurisprudence.’ (81)
In the rest of Chapter V, Hart examines the two types of rules. Firstly, 
he characterizes the primary rules of obligations in terms of serious-
ness of social pressure for compliance, importance for the preservation 
of social life, and confl ict with self-interests of those controlled by them. 
In addition, Hart elaborates the distinction between the internal and 
external point of view (introduced earlier in CL (see 56–7). He then 
goes on to examine the secondary rules of power.
In this context, Hart introduces and discusses the imaginary society 
without sovereign and his subordinates (91). He is asking the reader to 
imagine a primitive society governed by a set of primary rules of obliga-
tion that forbid the free use of violence, theft, and deception, prescribe 
performance of various services and contributions to the common life, 
etc. (See more on the content of these rules below.) Some members of 
society reject these rules or conform to them only out of fear of sanction. 
They take the rules from the external point of view. However, the vast 
majority of society’s members accept the rules and obey them. They 
“live by the rules seen from the internal point of view” (92). Unless 
such a society is small, made up of a close-knit population sharing com-
mon sentiment and belief, and placed in a stable environment, Hart 
contends, its formal structure “must prove defective and will requi re 
supplementation in different ways” (92). One defect would be the un-
certainty of the rules. If doubts were arisen as to what the rules are or 
as to the precise scope of a given rule, there would be no procedure for 
settling this doubt, either by reference to an authoritative text or to 
a society’s institution whose declarations on this point are authorita-
tive. Another defect would be the static character of the rules. There 
would be no means of deliberately introducing new rules or adapting or 
eliminating old ones in the light of changing circumstances in a society. 
In an extreme case, which “never perhaps fully realized in any actual 
community”, the obligation s, specifi ed in the rules, “in pa rticular cases 
could not be varied or mo difi ed by the deliberate choice of any indi-
vidual” (93). The last defect would be the ineffi ciency of the rules. If 
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disputes were arisen as to whether a rule has or has not been violated, 
there would be no society’s institution specially empowered to ascer-
tain fi nally and authoritatively the fact of violation (93–4).
The re medy for each of these defects of prim ary rules of obligation, 
Hart claims, would consist in the introduction of secondary rules of 
power. First, the remedy for the uncertainty of primary rules would be 
the introduction of the rule of recognition. It “specify some feature or 
features possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclu-
sive affi rmative indication that it is a rule of the group to be supported 
by the social pressure it exerts” (94). For example, in the imaginary ab-
solute monarchy under the Rex dynasty, the rule of recognition would 
be that whatever Rex I enacts is law (96). Second, the r emedy for the 
static character of prim ary rules would consist in the introduction of 
the rules of change. They empower “an individual or body of persons to 
introduce new primary rules for the conduct of the life of the group, or 
of some class within it, and to eliminate old rules” (95). Again, in the 
case of the imaginary absolute monarchy under the Rex dynasty, the 
rule of change would be that the eldest living male descendant, in the 
direct line, of Rex I, has the right to legislate. A further remedy for the 
static character of primary rules would be the introduction of rules that 
confer on individuals the power to vary their initial positions under the 
primary rules. These rules are akin to the rules of change involved in 
the notion of legislation (96). Third, the r emedy for the ineffectiveness 
of the primary rules would consist in the introduct ion of the rules of 
adjudication. They empower “individuals to make authoritative deter-
minations of the question whether, on a particular occasion, a primary 
rule has been broken” (97).
Hart m arks the i ntroduction of all these secondary rules of power 
into society as “the step from  the pre-legal into the legal world,”9 and 
equates its importance for a society with the invention of the wheel 
(42).
In Chapter VI of CL, Hart examines the rule of recognition in more 
detail and still further elaborates the distinction between the internal 
and external point of view. Of particular interest here is his remark 
about a legal system in which only offi cials take the rules from the inter-
nal point of view:
The society in which this was so might be deplorably sheeplike; the sheep 
might end in the slaughter-house. But there is little reason for thinking 
that it could not exist or for denying it the title of a legal system. (117)
The point is, as Hart makes clear later in CL, that the step from the 
pre-legal society to one with law would bring with it not only gains (cer-
9 There would be borderline cases where some, but not all, secondary rules 
of power are introduced Namely, Hart claims that the introduction of each of the 
secondary rule of power “might, in itself, be considered as a step from the pre-legal 
into the legal world”, since each one “brings with it many elements that permeate 
law”, while “certainly all three [secondary rules of power] together are enough to 
convert the regime of primary rules into what is indisputably a legal system” (94).
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tainty, dynamism and effi ciency of rules), but also the cost of risk that 
“the centrally organized power may well be used for the oppression of 
numbers with whose support it can dispense, in a way that the simpler 
regime of primary rules could not” (202). Does not the same point hold 
true for all inventions? Think of the above-mentioned analogy with the 
invention of the wheel.
The worlds in which rules would be different 
from those in our actual world
After considering law as the union of primary and secondary rules, 
Hart redirects his attention in Chapters VIII and IX of CL to the con-
sideration of the relation between law and morality.10
In the fi rst of these two chapters, he discusses the relevance of the 
idea of justice to law, the main features (importance, immunity from 
deliberate change, voluntary character of offences, and the form of 
pressure) that distinguish moral rules from legal rules and other types 
of social standards, and the role that moral ideals and principles play 
in a society and life of individuals.
Hart then goes on in Chapter IX to consider the contention that 
there is no necessary connection between law and morality. This con-
tention is most closely associated with the tradition of legal positiv-
ism. Hart distinguishes between two forms in which the contention has 
been rejected.
One of these is expressed most clearly in the classical theories of Natural 
Law: that there are certain principles of human conduct, awaiting discovery 
by human reason, with which man-made law must conform if it is to be 
valid. The other takes a different, less rationalist view of morality, and of-
fers a different account of the ways in which legal validity is connected with 
moral value. (186)
Hart devotes most of the chapter to an examination of the traditional 
natural law theory. Although he rejects its teleological view of nature, 
he accepts its claim about human survival as a goal of law and moral-
ity:
We are committed to it as something presupposed by the terms of the dis-
cussion; for our concern is with social arrangements for continued existence, 
not with those of a suicide club. (192)
Proceeding on this assumption, Hart begins to specify what he calls the 
“minimum content of natural law” (193).11
In this context, Hart introduces and discusses several imaginary 
worlds in which rules would be different from those in our actual 
world.12 First, he asks the reader to imagine a world in which human 
10 Although the “union of primary and secondary rules is at the centre of a legal 
system”, Hart claims, “it is not the whole” (99).
11 Hart stresses (1961 [1994]: 303) that his idea of minimum content of natural 
law is based on Thomas Hobbes’s and David Hume’s accounts of laws of nature.
12 See also Hart’s slightly earlier work (1958 [1983]: 79–81).
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beings were to become invulnerable to attack by each other, were ar-
mored perhaps like “animals whose physical structure (including exo-
skeletons or a carapace) renders them virtually immune from attack 
by other members of their species” or were incapacitated like “animals 
who have no organs enabling them to attack” (194). In such a world 
there would be little point, Hart claims, “for the most characteristic 
provision of law and morals: Thou shalt not kill” (195). Second, the 
reader is asked to imagine a world of human beings “immensely stron-
ger than others or better able to dispense with rest, either because 
they are far above the present average, or because most were far below 
it” (195). In such a world of “giants among pygmies”, there would be 
no special system of organized sanctions, but only a system “in which 
the weak submitted to the strong on the best terms they c ould make 
and lived under their ‘protection’” (198). Third, Har t asks the reader to 
ima gine still another world with devils “dominated by a wish to exter-
minate each other” and an opposite world with angels “never tempted 
to harm others” (196). In the former world, rules requiring forbear-
ances would be impossible, while in the latter one they would be un-
necessary. Fourth, the reader is asked to imagine a world in which 
the “human organism … have been constructed like plants, capable of 
extracting food from air, or what it needs … have grown without culti-
vation in limitless abundance” (196). In such a world, there would be no 
point in having rules that protect property. The last imaginary world is 
a pre-legal world that we encountered above. In this world human be-
ings were approximately equal in physical strength and vulnerability, 
and live under “a system of mutual forbearances”. Because of obvious 
advantages of submission to such a system, “the number and strength 
of those who would co-operate voluntarily” in its maintance woul d “nor-
mally be greater than any likely combination of malefactors” (197–98; 
see also 218–19). In such a world there would be no need for a special 
system of organized sanctions.
Considerations of these imaginary worlds enable Hart to make fi ve 
“very obvious generalizations” or “truisms” about the human nature 
and the character of physical world in which they live: human vulner-
ability; approximate equality; limited altruism; limited resources and 
limited understanding and strength of will. Given these fi ve truisms, 
Hart claims, certain rules necessary for human survival can be deter-
mined. They include rules that “restrict the use of violence in killing 
or infl icting bodily harm” (194), require “mutual forbearance and com-
promise” (195) and respect for property (196), enable “men to transfer, 
exchange, or sell their products” and secure the recognition of promises 
as a source of obligation” (197), and create a special organization for 
the detection and punishment “of those who would … try to obtain the 
advantages of the system without submitting to its obligations” (198). 
Hart calls these rules the minimum content of natural law.13
13 These rules, Hart writes, “are so fundamental that if a legal system did not 
have them there would be no point in having any other rules at all” (1958 [1983]: 80).
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3. Reconstructing legal theoretical thought experiments
After having summarized, the three imaginary scenarios in Hart’s CL 
and pointed to the context within which we encounter each of them in 
his work, I turn now to the main question of my article: Do the three 
imaginary scenarios in Hart’s CL constitute thought experiments? In 
the discussion of this question, I rely on a general characterization of 
thought experiments in philosophy accord ing to which they are:
– imaginary;
– counterfactua l scenarios;
– designed for special c ognitive purposes.14
C onsider how Hart’s scenarios satisfy the require ments of the above 
characterization.
First, Hart’s scenario of the absolute monar chy under the Rex dy-
nasty describes the imaginary monarchy. Hart claims that it is “proba-
bly far too simple ever to have existed anywhere” (53) and interchange-
ably calls it “imagined community” (52), “imaginary monarchy” (54), 
“imaginary simple world” (67), “imagined society” (68), and “imaginary 
kingdom” (96). As we saw in the previous section, the scenario reveals 
absurdities inherent in Austin’s notions of sovereignty and general 
habit of obedience, and suggests that the reader would consider the 
idea of rules as the way out of the absurdities.
Second, there is a certain ambiguity in Hart’s scenario of the pre-
legal society governed by primary rules of obligation. Hart writes that 
there are many studies of primitive communities which not only claim that 
this possibility is realized but depict in detail the life of a society where the 
only means of social control is that general attitude of the group towards its 
own standard modes of behaviour in terms of which we have characterized 
rules of obligation. (91)15
However, the scenario does not describe primitive communities without 
law which ever did or do now exist, but the imaginary pre-legal regime 
of primary rules of obligation. In “Postscript” to CL, Hart calls it “imag-
ined simple regime consisting only of primary rules of obligation” (249) 
and “imagined pre-legal regime of custom-type primary rules of obliga-
tion” (251). As we saw in the previous section, the scenario’s essential 
elements are defects of such a regime, even those that “never perhaps 
fully realized in any actual community” (93). These defects are uncer-
tainty, unchangeability and ineffi ciency, and the remedies for them are 
secondary rules of recognition, change and adjudication. Furthermore, 
the introduction of all these secondary rules of power together makes 
the step from the pre-legal into the legal world. The scenario suggests 
14 For more on this general characterization of thought experiments, see Gendler 
(2004: 1155), Roux (2011: 19–27), and Goffi  and Roux (2018: 440–41). See als o 
Miščević’s discussion on thought experiments in political phi losophy (2018; 2017) 
and Brun’s discussion on thought experiments in ethics (2018).
15 Hart cites several such works in an accompanying note (1961 [1994]: 291).
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that the reader would consider the idea of law as the union of primary 
rules of obligations and secondary rules of power.
Several authors have noticed a certain similarity between Hart’s 
scenario and John Locke’s account of the state of nature (Sartorius 
(1966 [1971]: 140); Bobbio (1968 [1988]: 70); Hacker (1977: 11); Fitz-
patrick (1992: 193); Postema (2011: 306); Simpson (2011: 174–77); 
Chiassoni (2013: 456)). Namely, in the Second Treatise of Government. 
Locke claims that the state of nature is defective, inconvenient to use 
his euphemism, because it lacks “an establish’d, settled, known Law”, 
“a known and indifferent Judge” and “Power to back and support the 
Sentence when right, and to give it due Execution” (1689 [1988]: 351). 
For these defects of the state of nature, Locke writes, “Civil Govern-
ment is the proper Remedy” (276). However, Hart does not mention 
Locke nor take any notice of the state of nature in CL.
Third, Hart’s scenarios of imaginary worlds in which rules would be 
different from those in our actual world are glaring examples of philo-
sophical fantasy (195).16 As we saw in the previous section, these sce-
narios refer to specifi c features of animals, fantastic beings and natural 
conditions, such as invulnerability, inequality, unlimited altruism, un-
limited selfi shness, unlimited resources, unlimited understanding and 
strength of will, which make them different from actual human beings 
and the world in which they live. The scenarios suggest fi rst that the 
reader would consider the most characteristic rules of law and morality 
to be different, if human beings and their natural conditions had any of 
the specifi c features above. Furthermore, they suggest that in consider-
ing this, she would also consider these rules as rooted in the physical 
world and our human nature. Finally, the scenarios suggest that the 
reader would consider the ongoing survival of a human society as con-
tingent upon the most characteristic minimum content of natural law.
The germ of Hart’s scenarios of imaginary words in which rules 
would be different from those in our actual world can be found in Pla-
to’s story of Gyges’ ring. Namely, in The Republic, Plato has Glaucon 
tell story about the ring which makes its wearer invisible to others 
human beings. One of the lessons to draw from this story is that in a 
world in which one were invisible there would be little point for the 
most characteristic rules of law and morality.17 Hart in CL mentions 
Plato twice (162, 186), but does not make use of his story.
4. Conclusion
Taking all the above points together, I conclude that Hart’s imaginary 
scenarios in CL fulfi ll the requirements of the general characterization 
of thought experiments that we can fi nd in the contemporary philo-
16 The discussion of these worlds, Hart writes, “involves the use of a philosophical 
fantasy” (1958 [1983]: 79).
17 On Plato’s story of Gyges’ ring as a thought experiment, see Becker (2018) and 
Miščević (2012).
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sophical literature. Thus, it is revealed that Hart’s interpreters are 
right, namely those who draw attention to the imaginary scenarios in 
Hart’s CL as thought experiments and the thought experimentation 
as an integral part of the methodology that underlies his work. Hart’s 
work should really be considered as a great example of the thought 
experimentation in the contemporary theory of law. However, the ques-
tion remains as to how much Hart’s thought experiments fulfi ll the 
basic desiderata for good or successful thought experiments. I have to 
leave this question to be considered on another occasion. Its discus-
sion would also require the consideration of various objections to Hart’s 
ideas of rules, union of primary and secondary rules and minimum con-
tent of natural law that are contained in the almost immeasurable lit-
erature on Hart’s CL published in the last fi fty and more years after 
its fi rst edition.
As always, the advice of Nenad Miščević has proved to be more than 
useful, while on this occasion I am especially grateful to him for his 
immense patience shown while waiting for this article to be fi nished.
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